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ABSTRACT
Privacy and security issues are frequently presented as major inhibitors of cloud adoption.
Some of these are operational issues and others relate to regulatory and compliance
requirements that vary by industry and location. There is a growing body of guidance that seeks
to clarify the implications of these concerns for various parts of the cloud supply chain. This
paper provides a review of the business and legal risks associated with cloud computing and
critically reviews the guidance available. It pays particular attention to the implications of the
PRISM revelations for the development of a cloud marketplace that aims to keep data private
and secure. A number of responses to cloud risks are available, including technological fixes
and business responses. Each response has its own costs and requirements in terms of
organisational capability and the paper evaluates the various responses that potential cloud
adopters can use to manage the risks associated with cloud computing.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing can be seen as a service–based perspective on the provision of computing
through the exploitation of technical innovations such as virtualization, high–performance
networks and data–centre automation (Venters & Whitley, 2012; Willcocks et al., 2014).
Academic interest in the topic has mirrored business interest in the opportunities it affords. For
example, in 2010, Amazon’s annual revenue from cloud services was estimated at between
$500m and $700m (The Economist, 2010) and Forrester have predicted a global market for
cloud computing worth $61bn for 2012 (Kirsker, 2012). Forrester believe that this will grow to
$241bn by 2020 (Dignan, 2011). Finally, a recent study by CEBR (2011) predicts that the
adoption of cloud computing has the potential to generate 763 billion euros of cumulative
economic benefits over the period 2010–2015 as well as an additional direct and indirect job
creation impact of nearly 2.4 million jobs (Centre for Economics and Business Research, 2011).
Despite these economic benefits, there are a number of espoused factors that are currently
limiting the take up of cloud computing. Some of the most frequently raised concerns relate to
questions of the security and privacy of data held in the cloud (Anthes, 2010; Krutz & Vines,
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2010; Paquette et al., 2010; Ryan, 2010). For example, a survey with over 1000 respondents
undertaken in 2010 found that over 60% of respondents believed that business risks associated
with privacy and security were greater for cloud services than traditional data processing. Over
50% reported greater concerns about data being held overseas and over 40% reported enhanced
concerns about compliance / regulatory issues (Willcocks et al., 2011a). This level of concerns
is echoed in more recent surveys (e.g. Computer Weekly, 2013).
In some cases these concerns were actually preventing the adoption of cloud services (Everest
Group, 2013). In other cases, security and privacy increased the costs of adopting cloud by
requiring increased diligence in assessing cloud suppliers (Seddon & Currie, 2013). Finally,
there is also the perspective, that these concerns can be exaggerated by IT departments who are
reluctant to cede further control over, or out of the IT function—departments, perhaps, that have
learned their own lessons from the outsourcing revolution.
The purpose of this paper is to review and contextualise the nature of these concerns, to evaluate
the guidance that is available about them and to assess the potential legal, technological and
business responses to them. Thus the paper’s purposes are to describe the main concepts relating
to privacy and security as they apply to cloud computing, relating exemplars of the existing
guidance to these concepts and hence enabling new concerns and forms of guidance to be
understood in relation to the existing available literature (Webster & Watson, 2002).
In particular, the paper suggests that the privacy and security concerns that can arise when
moving to the cloud are best understood from a risk–based perspective. This allows all parties to
differentiate between operational risks and regulatory and compliance risks. The review also
enables them to better appreciate which risks can be mitigated by an effective cloud sourcing
strategy, which can be addressed by cloud providers and which are the unavoidable but possibly
manageable risks of doing business.
The next section therefore seeks to understand the landscape of privacy and security concerns by
reviewing the key business and legal / compliance issues that cloud computing raises. In order to
ground these concerns, the paper focuses on the requirements of UK data protection legislation
that are driven by the EU Data Protection Directive. It contrasts them with associated regulatory
requirements in other jurisdictions, particularly the United States. This is followed by a section
that summarises some of the most recent guidance on privacy and security issues in the cloud.
This is followed a section that considers specific technological and business responses to the
privacy and security challenges. The paper ends with a summary of the likely future direction of
privacy and security in the cloud.
UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY CONCERNS
Some concerns with the privacy and security of cloud computing are based on business
considerations, others are grounded in specific legal and compliance requirements based on
industry or geographical requirements. Whilst some of these concerns are being reviewed in the
academic literature (particularly the law literature) other issues are currently grounded in
practice, practitioner reports and case studies and are only slowly finding their way into the
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academic literature (Swanson & Ramiller, 2004). This section therefore reviews these diverse
concerns that emerge from both theory and practice.
The Business Basis of Privacy and Security Concerns
Many of the privacy and security concerns raised in the context of cloud are a direct consequence
of the nature of the cloud proposition, particularly in the early years of cloud adoption where the
benefits have been invariably presented in terms of cost reduction. According to this view, cloud
computing transforms the nature of IT provision from specific, internally hosted and managed IT
resources to commodity hardware and software platforms hosted outside the organizational
boundary (Willcocks et al., 2014). In order to provide the lowest cost offering, cloud providers
may switch the (cloud) customer’s data and processes from one hardware instantiation to another
and it is precisely this switching that raises some of the privacy and security issues. Thus, in
Figure 1 the Cloud Customer has a contract with the Cloud Provider for the provision of cloud
services. This Cloud Provider runs two data centres (Data Centre 1 and Data Centre 2). In
addition, in order to manage loading issues, the cloud provider also has a contractual relationship
with a Cloud Sub Contractor which runs Data Centre 3. Thus, in this simplified scenario the
cloud customer’s data might be located or replicated in Data Centre 1, Data Centre 2 or Data
Centre 3.
Figure 1: Key cloud actors and relationships.

From a security perspective, if critical data and processes are hosted on various ‘random’
hardware instantiations, significant risks are introduced for the cloud customer. Some of these
risks have been discussed in the academic literature, whilst others have only been raised in
practitioner forums. In order to combine insights from the academic literature and the ‘grey
literature’, these issues are presented as a series of “questions”. The first set of questions relate
to concerns that cloud customers are asking. Typically these cloud customers are enterprises
using cloud services but equally could be members of the public using cloud technology directly.



How can the customer be sure that their data and processes are not accessible to
staff working for the cloud service provider or to other customers running their
services on the same hardware environment etc.?
How can the customer be sure that, when the use of the hardware comes to an end
(either when demand patterns change and cloud hardware is decommissioned or
when the cloud provider relocates the customer’s services to other, cheaper
computing resources) any data stored on that hardware is irreversibly removed?
Alternatively, if there are legal obligations on a company to retain data, what
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guarantees are there that the data will remain available for the retention period
(often measured in years)?
If the cloud provider is hosting mission critical services, how can the customer be
sure that the cloud provider’s disaster recovery plans are effective?
Is there a risk that despite claims that the choice of cloud provider is open and
based on commodity hardware that there will not be attempts to lock–in the
customer—either by using slightly non–standard hardware configurations or
because of the sheer impracticality of transferring data and processes to another
provider at contract renewal time?
What are the risks of using a cloud data–centre that is co–hosting many
companies’ data? “Sharing” a cloud provider with other brands can have
unintended consequences that cannot be easily calculated. For example, one
unintended consequence of Amazon and DynDNS hosting WikiLeaks was that
these services were targeted by hackers with consequent adverse effects on other
users of their services.

Cloud providers similarly face their own version of these challenges:








What levels of staff accreditation need to be implemented to demonstrate to
customers that their staff will not misuse the data held on their cloud hardware?
Would offering on–site security inspections reassure customers about security
concerns or would the costs of doing so be prohibitive?
What forms of data–wiping need to be offered to customers? How
computationally expensive are these processes and how does this affect the cost of
the cloud service? Would it be appropriate to offer these services at a premium or
is it best to develop an architecture that offers this functionality to all users?
What disaster recovery mechanisms should the provider have in place or should
they limit the service they offer to simple hardware platforms and put the
responsibility for disaster recovery on the customer? How will the provider’s
reputation be affected by a major outage?
How does the cloud provider balance between offering commodity products sold
on the basis of price and service quality and offering distinctive capabilities which
might raise customer concerns about lock in?

The Legal Basis of Privacy Concerns
Whilst many of the security concerns outlined above are driven by business needs (of the
customer and of the cloud providers), concerns over the privacy of personal data are often
directly linked to specific legal requirements regarding the processing of personal data. For
example, the EU data protection directive (translated into specific national legislation, such as
the UK’s Data Protection Act) places specific obligations on companies handling personal data.
In the UK personal data is defined as data which relate to a living individual who can be
identified from those data, or from those data and other information which is in the possession
of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the company and includes any expression of
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opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions in respect of the individual
(Information Commissioner's Office, 2013).
Similarly, the UK Data Protection Act defines the data controller as the entity who decides how
and why data is processed. Most frequently the data controller is an enterprise that is processing
the data about data subjects (the people whose data is being processed) but the data controller
could also be an individual member of the public. The actual processing of the data may be
handled by another party. The data processor processes the data on behalf of the data
controller. In many situations the data controller and the data processor may be the same
organisation but, with the growth of cloud and outsourced services, the data processor is
increasingly not part of the same organization as the data controller. Regardless of the
relationship between the data controller and data processor it is the data controller who remains
responsible for ensuring that “their” processing complies with the Act, whether they do it in–
house or engage an external data processor. Outsourced data processors are therefore not
directly subject to the Act. Where roles and responsibilities are unclear, the Information
Commissioner’s Office states that they will need to be clarified to ensure that personal data is
processed in accordance with the data protection principles adding that for these reasons
organisations should choose data processors carefully and have in place effective means of
monitoring, reviewing and auditing their processing (Information Commissioner's Office, 2013).
Although the Data Protection Act applies to all personal data, extra requirements apply when
handling “sensitive personal data” which is defined as data relating to the racial or ethnic origin
of the individual, his political opinions, his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature,
whether he is a member of a trade union, his physical or mental health or condition, his sexual
life, the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence, or any proceedings for any
offence committed or alleged to have been committed by him. In addition, certain regulated
industries impose their own best practice requirements in relation to the handling of data related
to their industry, for example, the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI–DSS)
which provide an actionable framework for developing a robust payment card data security
process requirements that apply (PCI, 2013).
The relationship between privacy and security can be seen in the seventh data protection
principle of the UK Data Protection Act. This provides that:
Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or
unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or
damage to, personal data (Information Commissioner's Office, 2012b).
The eighth data protection principle provides that:
Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European
Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for
the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data
(Information Commissioner's Office, 2012b).
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Figure 2: Key actors, relationships and jurisdictions.

It is the combination of these requirements that becomes important in the context of cloud
computing. To represent this,
Figure 2 updates Figure 1 to include the jurisdiction where each of the three data centres is
located. In addition, the paper adopts the terminology whereby the cloud customer in
Figure 2 is a data controller as defined by the Data Protection Act and the cloud provider is the
data processor. In the case where the cloud provider is offering software–as–a–service, rather
than infrastructures or platforms as a service, it is possible that they might actually be considered
as joint data controllers rather than data processors (Article 29 Data protection working party,
2010).
Thus, there is an obligation on a cloud customer, who uses a cloud provider to act as the data
processor, to ensure personal data is not being transferred outside the European Economic Area
unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of data protection rights. Only a few
countries are judged by the EU to offer an “adequate level of protection” including Switzerland,
Argentinia and Canada (EU, 2013). Thus, if Data Centre 3 is not in a territory that offers an
adequate level of data protection rights, the Data Protection Act prevents an EU cloud customer
from transferring the data to Data Centre 3 unless the cloud customer obtains the permission of
every person whose data would be transferred to that Data Centre. Another potential solution is
to utilise Safe Harbour type provisions, where cloud providers self–assert that they are in
compliance with EU requirements. When coupled with Binding Corporate Rules, these
mechanisms might offer sufficient mitigation of data protection concerns (King & Raja, 2013).
In the absence of one of these solutions, cloud customers might only be able to use a cloud
provider with a data centre in the EU and only then if the cloud provider can ensure that the data
is only held there. For example, although Amazon EC2 offers a choice of location for some of
its cloud services for customers to use: US East Coast, US West Coast, Asia and Ireland, an EU
based customer may only be able to use the Irish data centre. Such restrictions may limit
operational benefits that could be offered by the cloud provider including data replication that
might provide a cheaper service at a lower latency rate or an ability to reallocate resources
quickly if one data centre suffers a particular outage (Esayas, 2012).
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In other cases, the cloud provider may be unable to provide this information / guarantee that the
personal data is not held on cloud hardware that is not located within the EEA or in a suitably
accredited location.
Failure to address privacy and data protection concerns adequately can result in the cancellation
of cloud services. For example, in June 2013 the Swedish Data Inspection Board issued a
decision that prohibits the nation’s public sector bodies from using Google’s cloud based apps
including calendar, email and data processing functions (Davies, 2013). The ruling was based on
a risk assessment by the Board and is based on problems with the contracts offered by Google.
According to the Swedes, the contract gives Google too much covert discretion over how data
can be used and left public sector customers unable to ensure that data protection rights are
protected. Several examples of the kinds of deficiencies in the contract were noted including
uncertainty over how data may be mined or processed by Google and a lack of knowledge about
which subcontractors may be involved in the processing. The assessment also concluded that
there was no certainty about if or when data would be deleted after expiration of the contract
(Davies, 2013). In 2012 the Norwegian data protection authority insisted on contractual
adjustments for similar reasons before they would permit Norwegian local authorities to use
Google apps (Davies, 2012).
In contrast to the EU approach which sees privacy as a fundamental human right the US
approach tends to focus on preventing specific, serious risks of economic harm that may result
from misuses of sensitive personal data (King & Raja, 2013). Thus, there are categories of
consumer data that have strong information privacy requirements. These affect websites that
collect information on children under the age of thirteen years, financial institutions and credit
reporting agencies and health care providers. For example, in the health sector, the Office for
Civil Rights enforces the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) which
places specific obligations on health care providers and imposes security standards for the
security of electronic protected health information (Seddon & Currie, 2013).
In each case, the privacy requirements exist because there is deemed to be a clear link to
potential economic harm arising from the misuse of this data (King & Raja, 2013). One
consequence of these very different approaches to privacy protection is the lack of universally
applicable responses to the privacy concerns.
GUIDANCE AND ADVICE ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY ISSUES
At first sight, these privacy and security concerns might appear to be insurmountable and make
cloud computing an impractical option for most enterprises. However, numerous bodies have
issued advice and guidance on these issues. In addition to conventional engagement with the
academic literature, the authors are also immersed in a range of academic, civil society and
practitioner networks. This immersion includes subscribing to relevant mailing lists, giving
presentations for practitioners and participating in policy debates around privacy and security
with government and industry. These diverse networks provide two useful functions for this
review: first, they are useful gateways to the relevant grey literature; second, they provide frank
assessments of the usefulness or not of particular forms of guidance. For example, the authors
first became aware of the Sopot memorandum (described below) through participation in a
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practitioner network where a trusted colleague endorsed the utility of the document. Similarly,
they received details of the European Parliament report through a civil society discussion list
where the expertise of the report’s authors was widely acknowledged. These networks include
notifications of other forms of guidance, often accompanied by “less supportive” assessments of
the utility of the guidance. This paper has therefore drawn on these assessments in determining
which forms of guidance to focus on in this review.
The European Commission has a new strategy for unleashing the potential of cloud computing in
Europe which it claims will result in a net gain of 2.5 million new European jobs and an annual
boost of €160 billion to EU GDP by 2020 (European Commission, 2012). According to the EU,
the strategy is designed to speed up and increase the use of cloud computing and key actions of
the strategy include developing standards on issues including data portability and reversibility,
EU–wide certification schemes for trustworthy cloud providers and the development of model
‘safe and fair’ terms for cloud contracts. Similarly, the US and South Korean governments are
promoting cloud usage within government services, to both improve the quality and innovation
in services provided to their citizens but also to help develop the cloud competences more
generally (Esayas, 2012).
The first outputs from the EU work will be ‘safe and fair’ contract terms (Kroes, 2013). These
are needed, according to Neelie Kroes, Vice–president of the European Commission, because
“people don’t always understand the terms in their contract: what they’re paying for and what
they can expect”. She particularly highlighted the concerns of small and medium enterprises:
Who might hesitate to use the cloud because of fears that they will not meet their legal
obligations, or who might be worried that they get locked in or stranded by changes of
technology or service by cloud providers. They don’t want the risk of getting mired in
foreign court cases in foreign languages; nor of exposing the data which may be their
business’s life blood to security risks or breaches. And they cannot afford costly legal
fees to figure all this out case by case (Kroes, 2013).
More specific guidance comes from detailed reports such as the ‘Sopot memorandum’ produced
by Data Protection Commissioners from different countries to improve privacy and data
protection in telecommunications and media (International Working Group on Data Protection in
Telecommunications, 2012). The guidance notes that, at present, with the increased
globalization of data processing (perhaps, more accurately the use of “multiple locales (data
centres) distributed across different jurisdictions and different private operators” (European
Parliament, 2012)) there is a lack of transparency about cloud service provider processes,
procedures and practices, including whether or not cloud service providers sub–contract any of
the processing and if so, what their respective processes, procedures and practices are. They note
that this lack of transparency makes it difficult to conduct a proper risk assessment as well as
increase the difficulty of enforcing rules regarding data protection (International Working Group
on Data Protection in Telecommunications, 2012).
Important consequences of this lack of transparency include data being transferred to
jurisdictions that do not provide adequate data protection, acts in violation of laws and principles
for privacy and data protection and the data controller accepting standard terms and conditions
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that give the cloud service provider too much leeway, including the possibility that the cloud
service provider may process data in a way that contradicts the controller’s instructions
(International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, 2012).
The Working Group recommended that the adoption of cloud computing should not lead to a
lowering of data protection standards as compared with conventional data processing; that data
controllers need to carry out the necessary privacy impact and risk assessments (if necessary, by
using trusted third parties) prior to embarking on cloud projects. They also recommended that
cloud service providers further develop their practices in order to offer greater transparency,
security, accountability and trust in cloud solutions in particular regarding information on
potential data breaches and more balanced contractual clauses to promote data portability and
data control by cloud users (International Working Group on Data Protection in
Telecommunications, 2012).
In a similar manner, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office also issued guidance on cloud
computing (Information Commissioner's Office, 2012a). This noted that by processing data in
the cloud “an organization may encounter risks to data protection that they were previously
unaware of” and suggested that data controllers take time to understand the data protection risks
that cloud computing presents. In addition to the points noted above, the ICO’s guidance points
out that it may not be necessary to move all data and processing to the cloud and that many data
protection risks may be mitigated by separating out the processing of personal data from that of
non–personal data. The personal data could be processed internally and all other data processed
in the cloud. This avoids the legal uncertainties associated with the cloud based data.
It should be noted, however, that processing data in the cloud also often results in the creation of
audit records and other metadata. If this data is associated with particular customers then this
metadata is itself personal data (as it can be associated with an identifiable individual) and is
subject to the provisions of the Data Protection Act.
Whilst much of this guidance is written from the perspective of allowing / encouraging business
to keep using cloud services, there is some guidance that is presented firmly from the perspective
of the citizen whose personal data might be held and processed in the cloud. For example, in
2012 the European Parliament issued a report that explicitly sought to protect privacy in the
cloud (European Parliament, 2012) (rather than just ensuring compliance with existing data
protection legislation). The report suggested that the challenge of privacy in the cloud has been
underestimated if not ignored completely and suggested that the main concern for private
citizens is not so much the possible increase in “cyber” fraud or crime but is instead “the loss of
control over one’s data” (European Parliament, 2012). The report argued that from this
perspective the most disruptive feature of cloud computing has nothing to do with technical or
business innovation but is instead where “it breaks away from the forty–year–old legal model for
international data transfers” (European Parliament, 2012). As a result, the report argued that
consumers’ fundamental rights, as embodied in data protection, are lost in a complex mesh of
contracts and service level agreements with the private sector companies that are cloud
providers.
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Further effects on the legal rights of citizens regarding their data arise in the context of
“exceptional measures” taken in the name of security and counter–terrorism. As the report
noted, this is particularly significant in the US context where both the Patriot Act and the US
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act (FISAA) 2008. The Patriot Act was signed
into law in 2001 and included amendments to federal statutes that regulated wiretaps and access
to stored electronic communications. This was done in order to broaden law enforcement’s
access to electronic records (King & Raja, 2013). A particular concern related to the scope of
the provisions of the Patriot Act which offered protections for US citizens but not others
(Balboni & Pelino, 2013).
That is, jurisdiction matters (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). The legal environment that applies to the
cloud providers (and particularly the regulations that apply to the location where they host their
infrastructure) can limit any protections that citizens may expect with regard to the processing of
their data. For example, a number of companies claim that US “Safe harbour” certification
legalises transfers of EU data into US cloud (European Parliament, 2012). However, according
to the European Parliament report, §1881a of FISAA created mass–surveillance specifically
targeted at the data of non–US persons located outside the US (as would apply to cloud
computing). The law was passed in the aftermath of allegations of “warrantless wiretapping” of
US citizens where accounts emerged in 2005 that, in violation of strict constitutional protections,
surveillance of internet and telephone communications of US citizens (and legal residents) had
been conducted. After various legal measures and cases reviewing the relationship between US
citizens and others, Congress enacted FISAA in 2008.
The use of these types of powers re–entered the public imagination in May 2013 when whistle
blower Edward Snowden revealed that the US PRISM programme had been surreptitiously
surveying the communications data of US and non–US citizens including national leaders such
as German chancellor Angela Merkel (BBC News, 2013), with allegations that the UK
government was also monitoring this kind of data (The Guardian, 2013). Technology companies
and cloud providers like Google and Yahoo noted that they were not even allowed to disclose the
information they were forced to disclose to the US government. This highlights the risk that
cloud providers may be forced to disclose their clients’ data and may not even be allowed to
inform the clients that this has taken place.
In a briefing note to the EU Directorate General for Internal Policies, Bowden (2013) reassesses
the recommendations in the European Parliament report on cybercrime and privacy in the cloud
(European Parliament, 2012) in the light of the PRISM revelations. He recommends that
prominent notices should be displayed by every US web site offering services in the EU. In
particular, he argues that “users should be made aware that the data may be subject to
surveillance (under FISA 702) by the US government for any purpose which furthers US foreign
policy”. He further argues that since the other existing mechanisms for data export (such as
model contracts, Safe Harbour) are not protective against FISA or PATRIOT, they should be
revoked and re–negotiated. Finally, he recommends strong support for a European cloud
industry that would enable “durable data sovereignty” within Europe (Section 3.1). Other
reports have made similar recommendations (e.g. Bigo et al., 2013) and the ideas appear to have
gained traction in the negotiations around the new General Data Protection Regulation
(Brandenburg, 2013).
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RESPONDING TO PRIVACY AND SECURITY CONCERNS
Given the range of concerns faced by corporations moving to the cloud, it is unsurprising that a
range of responses are available to the organization. In addition to the guidance outlined above,
there are further options that organizations can use. The specific configuration of options will be
determined, to a large extent, by the maturity and evolution of the marketplace and institutional
actors (Kshetri, 2013) as well as the internal capabilities of cloud customers and providers.
Some options are technologically driven whilst others are business choices that will reflect the
risk profile of the enterprise.
Technological Responses
There are a range of technological responses to privacy and security concerns (Pearson, 2013).
One important development highlighted in the recent EU Data Protection Regulation (European
Commission, 2012) is the concept of privacy–by–design and, similarly, security–by–design
(Oetzel & Spiekermann, 2013). It is widely recognised that bolting privacy (and security)
functionality on top of an existing system is frequently ineffective and always more costly than
designing systems where these capabilities are built in from the start (Information
Commissioner's Office, 2008). Thus, enterprises seeking to use cloud services and cloud
providers hoping to increase their market share at a time of low trust in cloud computing services
might adopt privacy–by–design style thinking when developing their applications and services.
One example of such an approach which seeks to address the problem of concerns about third
parties gaining unlawful access to data held on cloud servers is to build in cryptographic
techniques into the cloud infrastructure (Pearson et al., 2011). These techniques encrypt data
(both personal data and enterprise data) as it moves to and from the cloud in much the same way
as it is now possible encrypt the personal data held on smartphones and tablets (Ryan, 2013).
These encryption services might be administered by the cloud customer, or might be offered as a
value–added service by the cloud provider. In each case, nevertheless, there can be significant
computational costs associated with the encryption / decryption process. In addition, there may
be liability issues associated with encryption services offered by the cloud provider: if they have
provided this customer with the decryption keys, what assurances does the customer have that
they haven’t shared the same keys with other parties?
The complexities and costs of managing the various encryption keys, issuing replacement keys,
authorising and de–authorising key users, are well understood in mainstream computing
environments and are increasingly being appreciated in the cloud context. As with many of these
responses, their successful implementation will depend to a large extent on the internal
capabilities and organizational learning of all parties in the cloud supply chain (Willcocks et al.,
2011b).
A related technological response is to have strictly enforced access controls associated with
cloud data and processing. These access control mechanisms help ensure that only suitably
authorised role holders are able to gain access to or modify data and processes in the cloud
(Noureddine & Bashroush, 2013). When successfully implemented, these techniques open up
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the possibility for innovative co–operation along an entire production supply chain. For
example, rather than having production and distribution data held by one of the hubs in the
supply chain, all this data could be held in the cloud with each part of the supply chain having
(suitably controlled) access to that part of the data that they need for their own stage of the
production process. Again, there is growing evidence of the complexity of managing this task
within modern enterprises where role definitions are increasingly fluid (JISC, 2010; Whitley et
al., 2014).
Another technological mitigation involves the choice of cloud model that the enterprise adopts.
For example, in some circumstances an enterprise might benefit from using a “private cloud”
rather than a “public cloud”. That is, it creates its own data centre within the organization’s
boundaries. This data centre can still offer the benefits of scalability and rapid provisioning of
computing resources, as well as the cost reductions associated with consolidated data centres, but
without running the risks of external organizations having access to their data.
Another alternative, suggested above, is a hybrid cloud model whereby some data (typically the
data that needs to be protected in terms of data protection legislation) is kept ‘in house’ whilst
less sensitive (or mission critical) data is held in a public cloud. In practice, however, the
boundaries between what should be kept in house and what could be held in the public cloud are
not clear cut. For example, office productivity tools like email and document processing can
frequently be provided at lower cost in the public cloud (e.g. Google Apps) but may, in fact,
contain personal data or commercially sensitive information that the enterprise deems should be
kept ‘in house’.
Cloud providers are also seeking to signal their security credentials transparently. For example,
Amazon has moved to acquire existing security standards (e.g. ISO 27001) for its cloud services.
Business Responses
In addition to technological responses to cloud privacy and security concerns, there are a range
of business responses that can be adopted. Assuming that the (cloud customer) enterprise has
actually read and understood the terms of the contact offered by the cloud provider, the
enterprise could use its risk profile to determine whether it is prepared to accept those terms or
offer a requirement for counter–terms. In some cases of a ‘single size for all’ type contract (such
as those offered by Google Apps to local authorities in Scandinavia) the opportunity for
negotiation may be limited. In other cases, on seeing a pattern of specific requests for certain
services or warranties, the innovative cloud provider may offer a range of different pricing
options for customers to choose amongst, thus segmenting the market place on the basis of price
and (additional) services offered.
For example, a cloud provider might offer potential customers the opportunity to do their own
penetration testing of the cloud provider or allow them to inspect the physical security of the data
centre or the vetting process for staffing hire. In other cases, third party certification agencies
might be prepared to assure the enhanced security and privacy claims made by the cloud
provider. In each of these cases, however, a cloud customer needs to be aware of the ‘Winner’s
Curse’ phenomenon (Kern et al., 2002). This phenomenon arises when, for example, an initially
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successful cloud provider who gains customers by offering higher levels of service loses that
capability as it becomes “too” successful and is unable to hire or retain key staff or expand its
hardware capabilities reliably.
Another response involves the close monitoring of service level agreements (SLAs) to ensure
that the cloud provider is actually providing the level of service that they had initially promised
(Willcocks et al., 2011b). Achieving this requires the development of in–house contract
monitoring capabilities. It also, of course, involves ensuring that the original SLA was read and
understood. In the case of commodified cloud resources, if the SLA is standard for that market
segment but doesn’t quite match the customer’s needs, the cloud customer must make a risk–
based assessment about whether to accept a contract with an SLA that is an imperfect match for
their requirements.
Another consideration, particularly at the commodity end of cloud SLAs, relates to what happens
if the promised service levels are not met. This is where the enterprise’s real understanding of its
cloud computing becomes paramount. The failure of a cloud service that allows customers to
locate their nearest store for twenty four hours is likely to cause fewer problems for a retailer
than the failure of its order processing system for 24 minutes. In the case of a failure to meet
agreed service levels (and this might only be spotted by active contract monitoring by the
customer), then the terms of the contract need to specify the compensation. In many cases this
will be limited to refunding the usage fee for the period of interruption which may only be a few
pounds. Close reading of the contract / service level agreement will reveal what duties the cloud
provider agrees to undertake and what duties it won’t. For example, following a failure with
Amazon’s cloud services in 2011, many of Amazon’s customers ‘discovered’ that customers
who launch server instances in different Availability Zones can “protect [their] applications from
failure of a single location” (Wang, 2011). That is, Amazon customers cannot depend on having
multiple “Availability Zones” within a specific region as insurance against system downtime
(Wang, 2011).
Given the uncertainty about effectiveness of SLAs and the potential costs of monitoring
performance, some businesses take a very different approach to managing their cloud risk
profiles. That is, rather than closely monitoring the SLAs they have with their cloud providers,
they mitigate their risks by drawing on a broad pool of potential cloud providers. If one cloud
provider appears to be performing at a substandard level, they simply reduce their usage of that
service and switch on alternative cloud providers.
Finally, it should be recognised that although cloud services may change the security risk profile
(Anthes, 2010) cloud providers may also be better able to manage security, respond to distributed
attacks and invest in sophisticated security hardware and software; facilities that are normally
unavailable to all but the largest enterprises. Indeed cloud providers may be able to spot unusual
activity, which the individual companies would be unable to identify, by using security analytics
to identify unusual behaviour patterns among pools of similar enterprises.
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CONCLUSIONS
There is increasing legislation in the security and privacy areas, generally and also in regard to
cloud and legislatures are increasingly trying to catch up with the implications of internet–based
technologies and put in place controls and associated penalties for non–compliance with these
controls. The ongoing EU discussions about the new General Data Protection Regulation
exemplify this point. As noted above, events such as the PRISM revelations can add further
perturbations to the regulatory environment. This has an impact on cloud clients and service
suppliers alike.
At first sight developments in legislation, guidelines and codes of practice on these privacy and
security concerns threaten to make cloud an unattractive option for many as there is an
increasing burden of regulation to comply with. However, there are a range of initiatives by
regulatory bodies offering guidance and advice. In the EU, the first outputs from this work are
the ‘safe and fair’ contract terms. More specific guidance comes from detailed reports such as
the ‘Sopot memorandum’ produced by Data Protection Commissioners from different countries
to improve privacy and data protection in telecommunications and media. Similarly, the UK
Information Commissioner’s Office also issued guidance on cloud computing to help businesses.
Other initiatives focus on the citizen perspectives and emphasize how important jurisdictional
issues can be, particularly in relation to privacy concerns.
Faced with these complexities, the paper presented a number of practical technological and
business responses to security and privacy concerns arising when moving to the cloud.
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